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HOW NAÏVE REALISM CAN EXPLAIN BOTH 
THE PARTICULARITY AND THE GENERALITY 
OF EXPERIENCE 
 
 
 
Visual experiences seem to exhibit phenomenological particularity: when 
you look at some object, it – that particular object – looks some way to 
you. But experiences exhibit generality too: when you look at a distinct but 
qualitatively identical object, things seem the same to you as they did in seeing 
the first object. Naïve realist accounts of  visual experience have often 
been thought to have a problem with each of  these observations. It has 
been claimed that naïve realist views cannot account for the generality of  
visual experiences, and that the naïve realist explanation of  particularity 
has unacceptable implications for self-knowledge: the knowledge we have 
of  the character of  our own experiences. We argue in this paper that 
neither claim is correct: naïve realism can explain the generality of  
experiences, and the naïve realist explanation of  particularity raises no 
problems for our self-knowledge. 
1. Introduction 
Since the demise of  logical positivism, it has been a tenet of  analytic 
philosophy that we must distinguish the metaphysics of  a domain from 
the epistemology of  that domain. But when it comes to debates about the 
nature of  visual experience, the two are closely intertwined. Debates about 
the nature of  visual experience often appeal to claims about the 
phenomenology of  visual experience in support of  particular views, so the 
kind of  knowledge we have of  the phenomenology of  our own visual 
experiences plays a role in philosophical theorising about the nature of  
those experiences. And some have thought that the kind of  knowledge it 
is in principle possible for us to have of  the phenomenology of  our own 
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visual experiences sets constraints on an account of  the nature of  visual 
experience. 
Here we consider how these issues play out in debates about the 
particularity and generality of  visual experience. Some of  our visual 
experiences seem to exhibit phenomenological particularity: when you 
look at this apple, it – that particular thing – looks some way to you. But 
experiences exhibit generality too: when you look at a distinct but 
qualitatively identical apple, things seem the same to you as they did in seeing 
the first apple. In §§2-4 we set out particularity and generality in more 
detail, and in §5 we spell out how, contra to what some have supposed, a 
naïve realist can account for both particularity and generality. Our goal is 
not to motivate naïve realism, or to argue that a naive realist can explain 
particularity and generality better than other approaches, but just to show 
that, contra to what some have supposed, a naïve realist can account for 
both particularity and generality.  
In spelling this out we end up with a view we call naïve realist particularism. 
One consequence of  this view is that experiences of  distinct particulars 
can differ phenomenologically, even if  that difference cannot be detected 
by introspection. But now it looks like the naïve realist particularist is 
committed to a claim about epistemology that some have found 
problematic: that there are aspects of  phenomenology which are 
necessarily introspectively inaccessible. 
Some naïve realists would embrace such an implication. But in §6 we argue 
that the naïve realist particularist is not committed to there being any 
aspects of  phenomenology which are necessarily introspectively 
inaccessible. Understanding why this is so can help us get a clearer view on 
the resources of  naïve realist theories of  visual experience, and on the 
character and limits of  the kind of  knowledge we have of  the 
phenomenology of  our own visual experiences. 
2. Phenomenological Particularity  
Consider a perceiver, Jaya. She glances over towards her desk and sees on 
it her mid-morning snack: an apple. There’s nothing abnormal about the 
perceptual conditions or situation, and there’s nothing abnormal about 
Jaya’s perceptual capacities. This is not a “bad case”, it is a straightforward 
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veridical visual perception: she simply sees the apple for what it is. She 
thinks, “I’m going to eat that”, making reference in her thought to the very 
apple in question.  
Jaya has a visual experience of  a particular entity: a particular apple, not just 
some apple or other but that one. Her experience thus ‘has particularity’ 
(Soteriou, 2000, p.174). Further, it is plausible to suppose that the 
particularity of  Jaya’s experience is reflected in its phenomenology, that it 
exhibits phenomenological particularity.1 We can see that this is plausible by 
observing that the following are natural or intuitive characterizations of  
the phenomenology of  Jaya’s experience: 
(1) It visually appears to her as if  that apple is there 
(2) It visually appears to her as if  that apple is red 
(3) That looks red to her 
 
Furthermore, that these are natural or intuitive characterizations of  the 
phenomenology of  Jaya’s experience not only makes it plausible to 
suppose that it exhibits phenomenological particularity, but 
phenomenological particularity of  a certain form. For consider the 
following characterizations of  the phenomenology of  Jaya’s experience:  
(4) It visually appears to her as if  there is an apple there 
(5) It visually appears to her as if  there is a red apple there 
(6) Something looks red to her 
 
These seem to leave something out. It is not just that the phenomenology 
of  Jaya’s experience is of  a particular, some particular or other: it is not just 
that it exhibits what we can call generic phenomenological particularity. The 
idea we are trying to capture, as Martin (2002) puts it, is that ‘the very 
object one is perceiving is an aspect of  the phenomenology of  one’s 
experience’ (p.196). Thus, the very particular that Jaya is perceiving (that, the 
apple) is an aspect of  the phenomenology of  her experience: it exhibits 
what we call specific phenomenological particularity. This is why (1)-(3) 
seem like more faithful characterizations of  the phenomenology of  Jaya’s 
experience than (4)-(6) taken on their own. 
 
1 C.f. Schellenberg (2016), p.28. 
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This is our starting point: that Jaya’s experience exhibits specific 
phenomenological particularity, and more generally that some of  our visual 
experiences of  particulars exhibit specific phenomenological particularity.2 
(We’ll now drop the qualification ‘specific’, and mean by 
‘phenomenological particularity’ specific phenomenological particularity 
unless otherwise stated). 
One might think that Jaya’s experience doesn’t exhibit phenomenological 
particularity, and that (1)-(3) aren’t natural or intuitive characterisations of  
the phenomenology. In response to such scepticism one option is to try to 
find some further reason for thinking that some of  our visual experiences 
exhibit phenomenological particularity. Perhaps we can operationalise the 
role that visual phenomenology plays in our cognitive lives and argue that 
unless some of  our visual experiences exhibited phenomenological 
particularity, then visual phenomenology wouldn’t be able to play that role. 
Perhaps that role is the role of  explaining our conception of  a mind-
independent world (Campbell 2002), or more generally, the role of  putting 
us in touch with the world (McDowell 1994). This would be a way of  
motivating our starting point: that visual experience exhibits 
phenomenological particularity. 
We won’t pursue this option here. Instead, we will take our initial datum 
for granted. But note that one reason for being a sceptic about our 
starting point is that one thinks it is ruled out by the generality of  
experience. That is, one might think that visual experiences cannot exhibit 
phenomenological particularity given certain possibilities connected with 
the generality of  experience: for instance, the possibility of  there being an 
experience of  a qualitatively identical but numerically distinct particular 
which Jaya cannot discriminate from her current experience. We are 
sensitive to this reason for scepticism, but it will take some work to turn 
this thought into an argument against the claim that visual experiences 
exhibit phenomenological particularity. We take on this task in the latter 
part of  this essay. Our aim is to show why these possibilities do not tell 
against visual experience exhibiting phenomenological particularity. To 
that extent, the argument of  the paper can be seen as removing one 
reason for rejecting our starting point. 
 
2 We do not intend this as a claim about all visual experiences. 
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3. Phenomenological Particularity and Naïve Realism 
Let naïve realism be the view that the visual experiences had in genuine 
cases of  visual perception are fundamentally constituted, at least in part, 
by non-representational perceptual relations of  conscious acquaintance 
between perceiving subjects and aspects of  the mind-independent world. 
This is not intended merely as a view about the metaphysical structure of  
experience, but also about its phenomenology (Logue, 2012, pp.211-212). 
Thus, according to the naïve realist, the phenomenology of  experience, too, is 
constituted, at least in part, by acquaintance between perceiving subjects 
and aspects of  the mind-independent world. On this view, such aspects of  
mind-independent reality are presented in experience, and thereby 
constitutively shape the contours of  consciousness (Martin 2004): the 
phenomenology of  an experience is as it is, at least partly because of, or in 
virtue of, the nature and character of  the aspects of  the mind-independent 
world involved in the experience. In terms of  the phenomenology-
constituting objects of  acquaintance, here we’ll focus mainly on particulars: 
including particular objects and instances of  qualities. But that is not to 
say that the naïve realist must hold that only particulars are presented in 
experience.3  
We can frame the project of  explaining phenomenological particularity as 
follows: Why is it that the particularity of  Jaya’s experience – that it is of  
that – is reflected in the phenomenology of  her experience? Naïve realism 
looks to provide a straightforward answer: The phenomenology of  Jaya’s 
experience is partly constituted by her being presented with that thing (the 
apple). And it – the very particular in question – is part of  what 
constitutively shapes the contours of  her conscious experience. That’s why 
her experience of  the apple exhibits phenomenological particularity. 
The naïve realist is thus well set to explain why (1)-(3) are faithful 
descriptions of  the phenomenology of  Jaya’s experience. It visually 
appears to Jaya as if  that apple is there, partly because the very thing in 
question is a phenomenology-constituting constituent of  her experience. 
And it visually appears to Jaya as if  that apple is red (that looks red to her) 
partly because the thing in question, that, is a phenomenology-constituting 
constituent of  her experience. Thus, the naïve realist’s answer to the 
 
3 The naïve realist is thus not committed to pure phenomenal particularism, in the terms of 
(Mehta 2014). 
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explanatory question of  why the particularity of  Jaya’s experience is 
reflected in its phenomenology falls out of  the constitutive account they 
give of  the phenomenology of  experience. 
From here on we will assume that the naïve realist is committed to the 
explanation of  phenomenological particularity just sketched out. 
References to ‘naïve realism’, ‘the naïve realist’, etc should be understood 
accordingly. Naïve realism looks well placed to provide an account of  the 
particularity of  experience. But many have thought that it cannot provide an 
account of  the generality of  experience. We turn to this in the next section. 
4. Phenomenological Generality  
Consider now Jaya on the following day. A creature of  routine, Jaya 
glances over towards her desk and sees on it her mid-morning snack: 
another apple. There’s nothing abnormal about the perceptual conditions 
or situation, and there’s nothing abnormal about Jaya’s perceptual 
capacities. This is not a “bad case”, it’s a straightforward veridical visual 
perception: she simply sees this apple for what it is. She thinks, “I’m going 
to eat that”, making reference in her thought to the very apple in question. 
Jaya has a visual experience of  a particular entity: a particular apple, not just 
some apple or other but that one. And her experience exhibits 
phenomenological particularity. But this apple is qualitatively identical to 
yesterday’s apple; the two apples are identical twins. And her experience of  
this apple has something in common with her experience of  that apple, the 
one she was looking at yesterday. Her experience exhibits ‘generality’ 
(McGinn, 1982, p.39): things seem the same to Jaya in both these experiences. 
(One might deny this claim, but we will not explore this idea here). 
A theorist of  experience needs to explain why things seem the same to 
Jaya in these experiences. But this seems to confront the naïve realist 
theorist of  experience with a challenge. The naïve realist emphasizes a 
difference in phenomenology between E1 (Jaya’s experience of  the first 
apple, a1) and E2 (Jaya’s experience of  the second apple, a2): for E1 and 
E2 each exhibit phenomenological particularity, but with respect to 
distinct particulars. How, then, can a naïve realist explain the fact that 
things seem the same to Jaya in E1 and E2, a fact which suggests that they 
are in some sense phenomenologically the same? We will understand this 
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as the demand to explain the generality of  visual experiences (Mehta 2014, 
Schellenberg 2010, p.29). 
The challenge to explain the generality of  experience looks similar to a 
challenge which has been raised for the naïve realist concerning 
hallucination. For consider E1 and now E3, a causally matching 
hallucinatory experience. The naïve realist claims that E1 and E3 are 
phenomenologically different. For the phenomenology of  E1 is 
constituted by acquaintance with a mind-independent particular, whereas 
that is not how things are with E3. But – it is claimed – in E1 and E3 
things seem the same to the subject. How can the naïve realist explain why 
things seem the same to the subject in E1 and E3 given the fact that they 
take there to be a phenomenological difference between them? 
One way to address this challenge is to hold that there is nothing more to 
the phenomenology of  the relevant hallucination than that of  being 
introspectively indiscriminable from the corresponding visual perception 
(Martin 2004, 2006). Now we don’t want to discuss the merits of  this 
response to the challenge about hallucination – our focus here is not 
hallucination. But we do want to point out that it is not plausible that this 
strategy can be extended to the challenge of  identical twins that is our 
concern here. For if  we apply the strategy, then we will answer the 
question of  why E1 and E2 seem the same to Jaya by claiming that there is 
nothing more to the phenomenology of  E2 than that of  being 
introspectively indiscriminable from that of  E1. But this is clearly not a 
plausible thing for a naïve realist to say about E2. For there is more to the 
phenomenology of  E2 than that of  being indiscriminable from that of  
E1: its phenomenology is (partly) constituted by a relation of  acquaintance 
that Jaya stands in to a mind-independent particular. Moreover, there are 
no obvious grounds for prioritizing E1 over E2 in the order of  
explanation, as this move does – prioritizing either one of  the pair would 
be arbitrary. We cannot apply the response to the challenge from 
hallucination to the case of  identical twins. 
We should, then, sharply distinguish the challenge which is posed to naïve 
realism from hallucination and the challenge which is raised from issues to 
do with particularity and generality (c.f., Schellenberg 2010, p.29). Our 
focus here is just on the fact that things seem the same to the subject in 
the pair consisting of  E1 and E2 – more generally, that things seem the 
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same to the subjects in what we’ll call Q-pairs, pairs of  introspectively 
indiscriminable veridical experiences of  qualitatively identical but 
numerically distinct particulars.4 
5. Phenomenal Character and Phenomenal Nature 
Given what they say about phenomenological particularity, how, then, can 
the naïve realist explain why Q-pairs exhibit generality, why things seem 
the same to the subject of  the experiences in these pairs? We think the 
naïve realist can meet the explanatory challenge here by making a 
distinction between the phenomenal nature of  an experience and the 
phenomenal character of  an experience. The generality of  experience is 
explained by the fact that the experiences in Q-pairs have exactly the same 
phenomenal character. In this section, we’ll spell out what this means, and 
how it is consistent with the naïve realist account of  phenomenological 
particularity. To do so, we adapt and develop the framework for thinking 
about the phenomenology of  experience offered to intentionalists in 
Martin (2002). 
5.1 Explaining Generality in terms of  Sameness of  Phenomenal Character 
Martin (2002) conceives of  the phenomenal character of  an experience as a 
general attribute of  an experience, something that is repeatable or 
shareable (p.194). Thus, the phenomenal character of  an individual 
experience is a feature of  the experience that could, in principle, be shared 
by numerically different experiences. He elaborates on this basic 
conception further by putting things in terms of  qualities. He identifies the 
phenomenal character of  a given experience as that which it ‘has in 
common with qualitatively the same experiential events’ (p. 194), where to 
consider an experience in terms of  its qualities or qualitatively is to 
abstract away from any particulars the experience may involve (p.187). 
Thus, the phenomenal character of  an individual experience could, in 
principle, be shared not only by numerically different experiences, but by 
numerically different experiences of  numerically different objects. 
 
4 By ‘introspectively indiscriminable’ we mean in principle introspectively indiscriminable, 
that is, where the experiences are not just indiscriminable because of some contextual or 
contingent feature, but indiscriminable per se. For more on this, see section 6.1 below. 
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With this notion of  phenomenal character, we can address the demand to 
explain the generality of  visual experiences. Consider Martin’s own 
illustrative example. Take Huey and Dewey, qualitatively identical rubber 
ducks. Now take H, the experience of  Huey, and D the introspectively 
indiscriminable experience of  Dewey. H and D seem the same to the 
subject of  them. How to account for that? Well, H and D have exactly the 
same phenomenal character. To specify this phenomenal character, we 
abstract away from any particulars these experiences involve and consider 
just their qualities. And to simplify, suppose that the only relevant quality 
here is the ‘presenting of  a yellow, duck-shaped object’ quality (Martin, 
p.187). Since H and D share this quality, they are both presentings of  a 
yellow, duck-shaped object, and thus they have exactly the same 
phenomenal character. These experiences thus differ in phenomenal kind 
from qualitatively different experiences, such as those which have not the 
aforementioned quality but qualities like ‘presenting of  a red, duck-shaped 
object’ or ‘presenting of  a yellow, pig-shaped object’. 
The explanation of  why things seem the same to the subject in H and D, 
and for why H and D are thus introspectively indiscriminable is that they 
have exactly the same phenomenal character. A similar story can be told 
for Q-pairs generally. 
5.2 Particularity and Phenomenal Nature 
But one might worry that this move is not open to the naïve realist, given 
that they want to account for phenomenological particularity in the manner 
set out above. For if  we conceive of  the phenomenology of  an experience 
in terms of  its phenomenal character, then we are conceiving of  
phenomenology qualitatively and thus in abstraction from any particulars 
involved in experience. And this is at odds with the above naïve realist 
explanation of  phenomenological particularity. Indeed, it eschews 
phenomenological particularity altogether. 
An assumption here is that the phenomenology of  an experience is to be 
identified with its phenomenal character. However, this assumption can be 
rejected. And this, we take it, is one of  the lessons of  Martin’s discussion. 
As we interpret it, we are to think of  the phenomenology of  an 
experience, what it is like for a subject to undergo an experience, as having 
two dimensions, only one of  which is phenomenal character. The other is 
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what Martin calls phenomenal nature. The generality of  visual experience is 
captured along the phenomenal character dimension of  phenomenology, 
particularity is captured along the phenomenal nature dimension. 
But what is phenomenal nature? An experience’s phenomenal nature is, 
according to Martin, what makes ‘room for the essentially or inherently 
particular aspects’ of  experience (p.192). It is an ‘unrepeatable aspect’ of  
perceptual phenomenology, an aspect of  it which is ‘proprietary to it as an 
individual, unrepeatable event’ (p.175). Moreover, a given experience’s 
phenomenal nature is partly individuated by the particular object or 
objects the experience is of  (p.187). Applying these ideas to E1, for 
example, yields the following: the phenomenal nature of  E1, PN1, is an 
unrepeatable dimension of  E1’s phenomenology which makes room for 
its inherently particular aspects, and which is tied to and partly 
individuated by the particular that E1 is an experience of, namely, a1. This 
means that similar or indiscriminable experiences of  distinct entities will 
not have PN1: they will have distinct phenomenal natures which don’t 
involve a1.5  
We are now in a position to clarify the naïve realist account of  
particularity. We put things above in terms of  the ‘phenomenology’ of  
experiences, but we can now be more specific. The naïve realist holds that 
the phenomenal nature of  Jaya’s experience of  a1, and thus the 
phenomenology of  Jaya’s experience of  a1, is partly constituted by Jaya’s 
acquaintance with a1 itself. Thus, the naïve realist can claim that the 
 
5 For our purposes here, the crucial point is that the distinct experiences of distinct entities 
differ in phenomenal nature, even if they are otherwise similar, or in principle 
introspectively indiscriminable, such that an experience which is not of a1 will not have 
PN1. Now, since Martin takes the phenomenal nature of an experience to be ‘proprietary 
to it as an individual, unrepeatable event’ (p.175), it looks as though Martin thinks that 
the phenomenal nature of a particular experience is unrepeatable in the sense of being 
unique to that experience – and thus not shared by any other experience. Thus, Martin’s 
discussion also seems to suggest that even different experiences of a1 will not have PN1, 
but they will have distinct a1-involving phenomenal natures. That’s why, in applying 
Martin’s notion of phenomenal nature to E1, we used the qualifier ‘partly’ in saying that 
the phenomenal nature of E1 is individuated by a1. If it were merely a1 which individuated 
the phenomenal nature of E1 then it is not clear why that nature would be unrepeatable: 
for there can be different experiences of a1. Presumably, then, on Martin’s view, 
whatever else makes E1 the unrepeatable event it is, such as perceptual context (i.e., 
conditions and circumstances of perception), place, time etc also individuate the 
phenomenal nature of E1. We will remain neutral on the question of whether distinct 
experiences of a1 have distinct phenomenal natures: for our purposes,  all that matters is 
that the phenomenal nature of a particular experience of certain particulars is not shared 
by distinct experiences of numerically different particulars. 
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particularity of  Jaya’s experience E1 is reflected in its phenomenology 
because the phenomenology of  her experience, in particular its phenomenal 
nature, is constituted in part by her being acquainted with the particular in 
question such that the particular itself  is part of  what constitutes what it is 
like for her to experience as she does. And a similar story applies to E2, 
Jaya’s experience of  a2. E2 will have an a2-involving phenomenal nature, 
namely, PN2, individuated in part by a2, and constituted in part by Jaya’s 
acquaintance with a2.  
Thus, the naïve realist can capture the phenomenological difference between 
E1 and E2 in terms of  their distinct phenomenal natures, PN1 and PN2, 
the former being a1-involving, the latter being a2-involving. And this 
applies to Q-pairs more generally. 
5.3 The Relation Between Phenomenal Character and Phenomenal Nature 
The discussion of  phenomenology and particularity which we have drawn 
from Martin was originally applied in the context of  how an intentionalist 
can account for both particularity and generality. We have adapted Martin’s 
discussion in the present context by applying it to the question of  how a 
naïve realist can account for both particularity and generality. But what 
more can we say about the relationship between phenomenal character 
and phenomenal nature? We now want to adapt and develop Martin’s 
framework further by discussing this question. (We don’t assume that 
Martin would agree with any of  the discussion to follow.) 
Let’s lift some of  the simplification in play so far and elaborate on the 
naïve realist account of  E1 and its phenomenal nature. In this experience, 
Jaya is consciously acquainted with, and thus perceptually presented with a 
particular object: a red apple. Let’s suppose she is also acquainted and thus 
perceptually presented with its colour and shape: the redness of  the apple, 
and the apple-shapedness of  the apple. The naïve realist can take this 
complex structure of  acquaintance to be (part) constitutive of  the 
phenomenal nature of  E1, PN1. But then, in virtue of  this complex 
phenomenal nature, E1 has the phenomenal character it has, call this PCE: 
namely, it is a presenting of  a red, apple-shaped object. 6  The phenomenal 
 
6 This still involves a simplified specification of the phenomenal character of E1. But 
other aspects of phenomenal character, understood as qualitative character, will similarly 
be traceable to corresponding aspects of phenomenal nature. See fn.8 below. 
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character of  E1 is, as it were, the qualitative shadow of  its phenomenal 
nature. More generally, the naïve realist can claim that our (genuinely 
perceptual) experiences have the phenomenal characters they have in 
virtue of  the phenomenal natures they have. Phenomenal characters are 
qualitative shadows of  phenomenal natures. 
To spell this out further, what explains the type of  phenomenal character a 
genuinely perceptual experience of  certain particulars has is the type or 
qualitative identity of  its particulars. An experience of  certain particulars has 
a phenomenal character of  the type it has in virtue of  the type or 
qualitative identity of  the particulars involved in its phenomenal nature. To 
illustrate this, let’s return to E1. In this experience, as noted, Jaya is 
acquainted with an apple, its redness and its apple-shapedness. E1 has the 
type of  phenomenal character it has – it is a presenting of  a red, apple-
shaped object – because of  the type or qualitative identity of  the particulars its 
phenomenal nature involves. E1 is a presenting of  a red, apple-shaped 
object because the phenomenal nature of  E1 involves the presenting of  
an instance of  redness. E1 is a presenting of  an apple-shaped object because 
the phenomenal nature of  E1 involves the presenting of  an instance of  
apple-shapedness. 
5.4 Putting the Distinction to Work 
We are now in a position to see how the naïve realist can make sense of  
why E1 and E2 have exactly the same phenomenal character, even though 
they have different phenomenal natures.7 E2 has the type of  phenomenal 
character it has – it is a presenting of  a red, apple-shaped object – because of 
the type or qualitative identity of  the particulars its phenomenal nature 
involves. E2 is a presenting of  a red, apple-shaped object because the 
phenomenal nature of  E2 involves the presenting of  an instance of  
redness. E2 is a presenting of  an apple-shaped object because the 
phenomenal nature of  E2 involves the presenting of  an instance of  apple-
shapedness. 
Thus, what accounts for the character of  E1 is exactly the same as what 
accounts for the character of  E2: the type or qualitative identity of  the 
presented particulars. That is, E1 and E2 have exactly the same 
 
7  Given this, phenomenal character is thus multiply realizable on the view we are 
sketching (Schellenberg (2010, p.30)). 
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phenomenal character despite their different phenomenal natures, because 
the numerically different elements of  their phenomenal natures which are 
involved in accounting for this sameness of  character are type or 
qualitatively identical.8 
5.5 Naïve Realist Phenomenal Character 
On the account we are sketching the phenomenal nature dimension of  
phenomenology constitutively depends upon those very particulars. But 
the phenomenal character dimension does not. Despite this, given the 
relation between phenomenal nature and phenomenal character, the view 
still involves a naïve realist conception of  phenomenal character. How so? 
We’ve been talking only about the phenomenal character of  genuinely 
perceptual experiences of  particulars. This is phenomenal character of  a 
certain sort. Regarding phenomenal character of  this sort, we’ve claimed 
that the type of  phenomenal character that an experience has depends 
upon the type or qualitative identity of  the particulars involved in the 
experience’s phenomenal nature (more metaphorically, phenomenal 
character is the qualitative shadow of  phenomenal nature). Accordingly, 
phenomenal character is such that an experience cannot have it unless it 
has a phenomenal nature involving particulars which correspond, in their 
 
8 Note that we have been focusing on the shared phenomenal character, being a presenting 
of a red, apple-shaped object. But one might think that there is a more fundamental aspect to 
the shared phenomenal character in E1 and E2: namely, that of seeming as if there is 
something red and apple-shaped present. And one might wonder whether this is explicable 
merely in terms of the type or qualitative identity of the particulars involved in the 
phenomenal natures of these experiences. After all, it seems possible that an experience 
could involve the very same particulars in its phenomenal nature, and thus have 
a presenting of a red, apple-shaped object character, yet not be one in which it seems to the 
subject as if there is something red and apple-shaped present (e.g., in certain sorts of 
illusions). And this might make one wonder whether, even when one has an experience 
where it does seem to the subject as if there is something red and apple-shaped present, 
this can be explained merely in terms of the type or qualitative identity of the particulars 
involved. Now the line of thought just sketched certainly deserves more scrutiny than we 
are giving it here. But suffice it to say that the idea that there are aspects of phenomenal 
character that aren’t explicable in terms of phenomenal nature only follows (if at all) if we 
focus only on the particulars involved in E1’s phenomenal nature, as we have been doing 
in this paper. But once we broaden our discussion to recognise the way in which facts 
about the subject of experience (Logue 2012), facts about the way or manner in which 
one is acquainted with the objects of experience (Soteriou 2013), and facts about the 
circumstances and conditions of perception (Campbell 2009, Brewer 2011) all affect an 
experience’s phenomenal nature, then there remains the option of explaining this further 
aspect of phenomenal character in terms of the experience’s phenomenal nature, 
understood as involving further specification along each of these dimensions. 
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type or qualities, to the type of  phenomenal character in question. For 
instance, take PCE: being a presenting of  a red, apple-shaped object. No 
experience can have this phenomenal character unless it has a phenomenal 
nature (such as PN1 or PN2) involving appropriate particulars (e.g., a red 
apple or a red apple-shaped object, an instance of  redness, and apple-
shapedness, etc). 
Given that the particulars we are focusing on here are mind-independent, 
we take this to encode a naïve realist conception of  phenomenal character. 
Take an experience with phenomenal nature PN1 and phenomenal 
character PCE. It follows from our conception of  phenomenal character 
that no experience could have PCE unless it involved the perception of  a 
mind-independent object which is of  the same type or qualitative profile 
to mind-independent objects which constitute PN1. This doesn’t mean, 
then, that PCE depends upon the very objects seen in this particular case. It 
does mean, though, that if  an experience is to have that character it must 
involve perception of  some such mind-independent particular. The 
difference is between dependence upon this mind-independent object and 
dependence upon such a mind-independent object as this (cf. Martin 2006). 
Thus, on the naïve realist view we are developing, both phenomenal 
nature and phenomenal character depend on mind-independent objects; 
it’s just that the dependence on mind-independent objects in each 
dimension is different.9 
5.6 Summary: Naïve Realist Particularism 
We have suggested that the naïve realist should explain the particularity of  
perceptual experiences in terms of  the phenomenal nature of  perceptual 
experiences, and the generality of  perceptual experiences in terms of  the 
phenomenal character of  perceptual experiences. (We are focusing only on 
 
9 One consequence of this is that our view inherits the usual commitments of naïve 
realism regarding hallucination. Recall E3. Given that E3 doesn’t have a phenomenal 
nature involving any mind-independent particulars, it doesn’t have phenomenal character 
of the sort that E1 and E2 has. It doesn’t have PCE or any such naïve realist phenomenal 
character. Thus, for causally matching hallucinations, it looks like we are committed 
either to some sort of disjunctivism about phenomenal character (Martin 2004, 2006), or 
else to some sort of eliminativism about hallucinatory character (Fish 2009). Many will 
find this consequence problematic. But it strikes us a feature of the naïve realist 
framework, and not a special problem to do with the framework as developed with respect 
to particularity or generality. We thus set it aside in what follows. 
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genuinely perceptual veridical experiences of  particulars, in the visual 
modality). And we have set out what a naïve realist should say about what 
makes it the case that such experiences have the characters they do. The 
naïve realist account we have offered is that an experience has its 
phenomenal character in virtue of  its phenomenal nature. We have spelled 
this out further by claiming that the type of  phenomenal character an 
experience has will depend upon the type or qualitative identity of  the 
mind-independent particulars involved in the phenomenal nature of  the 
experience. This view involves naïve realist accounts of  both phenomenal 
nature and phenomenal character.   
One can certainly be a naïve realist and not endorse all of  what we’ve 
sketched out here. Thus we’ll call the position we’ve developed naïve realist 
particularism to mark it out from other versions of  naïve realism. 
6. The Self-Knowledge Argument 
Naïve realist particularism has it that Q-pairs are both the same and 
different phenomenologically. This is possible insofar as phenomenology 
has two dimensions, phenomenal nature, where they differ, and 
phenomenal character, where they are the same. The pairs differ in 
phenomenal nature in virtue of  involving numerically distinct particulars, 
they are the same in phenomenal character in virtue of  involving 
qualitatively identical particulars. 
We are now in a position to consider and elaborate an argument against 
this position which concerns the kind of  knowledge we have of  the 
phenomenology of  our own visual experiences. We’ll call this the self-
knowledge argument against naïve realist particularism. We’ll set out the 
argument in 6.1 and explain how the naïve realist particularist can respond 
in 6.2. 
6.1 Formulating the Self-Knowledge Argument 
To build up to this argument we need first to outline a principle we find in 
Schellenberg (2010) and Montague (2016). Consider first Schellenberg:  
Positing such object-dependent and unrepeatable phenomenal natures 
entails that any two experiences of  distinct objects necessarily differ 
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phenomenally; even if  the relevant objects are qualitatively 
indistinguishable. This consequence is counterintuitive as a thesis about 
phenomenology. It is counterintuitive even if  one acknowledges that 
two experiences can exhibit a phenomenal difference while being 
subjectively indistinguishable. Granted it is plausible that two 
experiences could be subjectively indistinguishable despite phenomenal 
differences between the experiences due to minute differences in the 
perceived colors or shapes. Such differences are, however, at least in 
principle subjectively accessible since there is a qualitative difference between 
the perceived the colors or shapes. We would detect the differences, 
were our sensory apparatus better. The case of  numerically distinct but 
qualitatively indistinguishable objects is different, since in this case 
there is no qualitative difference between the perceived objects. We 
could not detect a difference, even if  our sensory apparatus were 
perfect. So accepting the possibility of  such differences in 
phenomenology that are not subjectively accessible requires accepting 
that there can be aspects of  phenomenology that are in principle not 
subjectively accessible to the experiencing subject (pp.30-31). 
Applying Schellenberg’s worry to our Q-pair, the point is that however 
perfect Jaya is as a perceiver, however perfect her sensory apparatus, 
however perfect the conditions of  perception, the phenomenological 
difference between her experience of  a1 and her experience of  a2 that the 
naïve realist particularist posits is subjectively inaccessible to her. The two 
experiences are not merely contingently or contextually subjectively 
indiscriminable; they are in principle subjectively indiscriminable, and that, 
according to Schellenberg, is problematic. 
Montague may have a similar argument in mind in the following passage. 
Her focus is Martin’s (2002) account, but the criticism carries over to naïve 
realist particularism too. She argues as follows: 
… According to Martin, the phenomenal nature of  an experience is the 
presentation of  a particular physical object. Consider the sense in which 
‘being present’ is meant to be a phenomenological notion. According 
to Martin, if  a physical object does not constitute part of  the 
phenomenology of  an experience it is not present in experience. There 
is, however, a clear sense in which physical objects do not constitute 
part of  the phenomenology of  experience. If  veridical perceptions and 
their corresponding hallucinations can indeed be subjectively 
indistinguishable, then ‘qualitative content’, in Martin’s terms, accounts 
entirely for the phenomenology of  these experiences. So physical objects, 
as such, do not play a role in determining the phenomenology of  veridical 
perceptions. If  physical objects did play such a role, given that they are extra 
ingredients in veridical perceptions, then it seems there would have to be detectable 
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phenomenological differences between veridical perceptions and their corresponding 
hallucinations (pp. 132-133, emphasis added). 
The crucial move in the above seems to be the segment we have 
emphasised. Montague makes her claim in the context of  discussing the 
relation between veridical perceptions and their corresponding 
hallucinations, but we will reformulate the argument in terms of  the 
experiences of  qualitatively identical twins since, as noted above, it 
sharpens the force of  the challenge. The reformulated version of  
Montague’s claim has it that if  the experiences of  qualitatively identical 
twins are subjectively indiscriminable, then the particular objects perceived 
in each case cannot play a role in determining the phenomenology of  each 
experience. And the reasoning seems to be that they cannot play such a 
role because if  they did, then the phenomenological difference between 
the experiences would be detectable contrary to our initial supposition. 
And though she doesn’t say precisely what she means by ‘detectable’, and 
she sometimes speaks of  ‘phenomenological’ detection, and she doesn’t 
explicitly draw on introspection as Schellenberg does (c.f., Schellenberg, p. 
29), we interpret Montague’s discussion in terms of  introspective 
detectability. Accordingly, the idea seems to be that phenomenological 
differences between Q-pairs must in principle be introspectively 
detectable, that is, detectable by introspection on the phenomenology of  
the experiences. 
Schellenberg and Montague seem, then, to endorse the following principle: 
The Phenomenological Differences Principle (PDP) 
Phenomenological differences between Q-pair experiences must be in 
principle detectable by means of  introspection.10 
And a straightforward argument against naïve realist particularism is that it 
falls foul of  (PDP). 
 
10 Here ‘phenomenological’ covers both character and nature. And note again that the notion of ‘being 
in principle undetectable’ rules out explanations of the introspective indiscriminability which turn on 
the cognitive limitations of the agent, for the question is not about whether there can be 
phenomenological differences which are undetectable for this or that agent, given her particular context 
etc., but whether there can be phenomenological differences which are undetectable tout court. We will 
assume this impersonal conception of being undetectable in what follows. On which see Martin (2006). 
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One problem here, though, is that (PDP) is not self-evident, and as far as 
we can tell Schellenberg and Montague do not do any substantive work to 
support it. Absent any argument or motivation for (PDP), the naïve realist 
particularist can claim that their view does conform to (PDP), but that this 
is just a consequence of  their view, not a problem with it. 
Let us consider, then, the reasons to endorse (PDP). (PDP) is most 
plausibly supported by a more general thought about the way in which the 
phenomenology of  perceptual experiences interacts with our knowledge 
of  the phenomenology of  our perceptual experiences. That is, lying 
behind the principle is a view about the relation between the 
phenomenology of  perceptual experiences and our introspective 
knowledge of  that phenomenology. Consider the fact that, as conscious 
subjects, we are often in a position to know something about the 
phenomenology of  our perceptual experiences. This knowledge plays a 
role in philosophical theorising about the nature of  perceptual experience. 
Questions about the character, source, and limits of  our knowledge of  the 
phenomenology of  perceptual experience are thus relevant to discussions 
about the phenomenology of  perceptual experiences. 
This raises the following question: does the nature of  the introspective 
knowledge we have of  the phenomenology of  our perceptual experience 
place any constraints on our accounts of  the nature of  perceptual 
experience? (PDP) expresses such a constraint: it holds that 
phenomenological differences between Q-pair experiences must be in 
principle introspectively detectable – which is to say, knowable on the 
basis of  introspection. And one might try to motivate (PDP) by appeal to 
a more general link between phenomenology and knowledge of  
phenomenology. We call this the Self-Knowledge Principle: 
The Self-Knowledge Principle (SKP) 
There cannot be aspects of  phenomenology which are in principle 
introspectively unknowable. 
According to (SKP), all aspects of  phenomenology are in principle 
introspectively knowable. If  the phenomenological differences between 
pairs of  experience are aspects of  phenomenology, they too must be in 
principle introspectively detectable. So a commitment to the (SKP) 
explains why someone would hold (PDP). 
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But why would someone endorse (SKP)? One thought is that the 
phenomenology of  a perceptual experience just is the way in which things 
seem to the subject when she undergoes that experience (McGinn 1982, 
pp.9-10). And how things seem to a subject is an aspect of  her conscious 
life. But there cannot be aspects of  a subject’s conscious life which are in 
principle inaccessible to her. We can make sense of  there being aspects of  
the external world which are forever beyond us. But our conscious life 
seems too intimately connected to us to be forever closed off  in this kind 
of  way. 
However, the problem with motivating (PDP) via (SKP) is that (SKP) 
places a luminosity constraint on phenomenological aspects, and Timothy 
Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument (2000, ch.4) poses an influential 
challenge to any such constraint. Thus, it is open to the naïve realist 
particularist to adopt some such argumentative strategy to reject (SKP), 
and thus undercut the support we have found for (PDP). Indeed, some 
naïve realists already reject such luminosity constraints. For instance, in 
responding to the problems caused by hallucinations Matthew Soteriou 
suggests that the naïve realist acknowledge that ‘we are not infallible when 
it comes to making judgements about the phenomenal character of  our 
own experiences. We need to accept a more modest view of  the extent to 
which we can know our own minds and mental lives. Not even the 
phenomenal properties of  our own mental events are luminous’ (2013, 
p.199). 
Is there an alternative way of  motivating (PDP) which doesn’t involve a 
commitment to luminosity? Although (PDP) follows from (SKP), together 
with the assumption that phenomenological differences are aspects of  
phenomenology, the opponent of  naïve realism need not accept (SKP) in 
its full generality. That is, they might deny that (SKP) is a general truth about 
the link between aspects of  phenomenology and introspective knowability, 
whilst holding that there are still good reasons to think that a restricted 
version of  the principle holds in the case at hand. That is, the opponent 
of  naïve realism may take there to be something problematic about the 
denial of  (SKP) in this particular case. 
Why would the denial of  (SKP) be particularly objectionable in the cases 
under consideration? Williamson’s argument against luminosity principles 
turns on the failure of  luminosity in borderline cases. So someone who is 
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sympathetic to Williamson’s argument might see the case for denying that 
aspects of  phenomenology are always introspectively knowable in 
borderline cases. But this wouldn’t entail that there could be aspects of  
phenomenology which were in principle introspectively unknowable in 
non-borderline cases (Hawthorne 2005). And the cases of  qualitatively 
identical but numerically distinct twins that we have been concerned with 
do not seem to be borderline or odd in some other way which would be 
relevant for the general denial of  (SKP). Thus, it looks like it is the 
plausibility of  (SKP) for the cases at hand which motivates (PDP).11 
Given this, we are now in a position to formulate the Self-Knowledge 
Argument against naïve realist particularism which utilizes a Restricted 
Self-Knowledge Principle. The argument runs as follows: 
The Self-Knowledge Argument 
1. Naïve realist particularism entails that there can be phenomenological 
differences between Q-pair experiences which are in principle 
undetectable by means of  introspection. 
2. If  there can be phenomenological differences between Q-pair 
experiences which are in principle undetectable by means of  
introspection, then there can be aspects of  the phenomenology of  the 
experiences in Q-pairs which are introspectively unknowable. 
3. Restricted Self-Knowledge Principle (RSKP): There cannot be 
aspects of  phenomenology which are in principle introspectively 
unknowable in Q-pairs. 
Therefore, 
4. Naïve realist particularism is false. 
 
How should the naïve realist particularist respond to this argument? 
6.2 Rejecting the Self-Knowledge Argument 
 
11 This reinforces our decision to focus solely on the case of identical twins here because, 
once again, they raise a more difficult problem for naïve realism than the case of causally 
matching hallucination. Hallucinations might be thought to be sufficiently odd that the 
denial of the Self-Knowledge Principle can be motivated for such experiences but, again, 
on the face of it, it seems much less compelling to make that move for the case of 
identical twins. 
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One strategy for responding to this argument is to reject even (RSKP). 
But a naïve realist who opts for this strategy owes us an explanation of  why 
it is that (RSKP) is false. And we have suggested above that the reasons 
for thinking that the more general (SKP) is false don’t obviously carry over 
to the restricted version. Our aim in this section is to show how the 
argument can be rejected without denying (RSKP). 
Let us start with (1). This claim states that naïve realist particularism 
entails that there can be phenomenological differences between Q-pair 
experiences which are in principle undetectable by means of  introspection. 
Is this true? We take the phenomenological difference between E1 and E2 
to be a certain relation which holds between E1 and E2: most basically, it is 
the relation of  being non-identical which holds between the phenomenal 
nature of  E1 (which involves this apple), and the phenomenal nature of  
E2 (which involves that non-identical apple). On this understanding, it is 
true that naïve realist particularism entails that there are phenomenological 
differences between experiences in Q-pairs (since it holds that the 
experiences have distinct phenomenal natures). 
Does it follow that naïve realist particularism entails that there can be 
phenomenological differences between experiences in Q-pairs which are in 
principle undetectable by means of  introspection? There are ways in which one 
might deny this claim, but we will accept it here. The reasoning runs as 
follows: when Jaya is undergoing E1, she is in a position to know that she 
is having an experience with a phenomenal nature involving that particular 
apple. And this is because the phenomenal nature of  the experience is 
given to her in introspection. And when she is undergoing E2 she is in a 
position to know that she is having an experience with a phenomenal 
nature involving that (as it happens, distinct) apple. For this phenomenal 
nature is something which is given to her in introspection. But the relation 
between the two experiences is not itself  something which is given in 
introspection. So she cannot come to know that the relation of  non-
identity holds on the basis of  introspection: there are phenomenological 
differences between experiences in Q-pairs which are in principle 
undetectable by means of  introspection.12 
 
12 It is important here that the claim is that the phenomenological differences cannot be 
detected by means of introspection. For one might hold that knowledge requires ruling 
out relevant alternatives – in which case, Jaya’s knowledge that she is having an 
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This leaves us with (2). Let’s call it the Linking Principle 
The Linking Principle (LP) 
If  there can be phenomenological differences between Q-pair experiences 
which are in principle undetectable by means of  introspection, then there 
can be aspects of  the phenomenology of  the experiences in Q-pairs which 
are introspectively unknowable. 
Applying this to the case at hand, (2) says that if  the phenomenological 
difference between E1 and E2 is introspectively undetectable, then there 
can be introspectively unknowable aspects of  the phenomenology of  
these experiences. The principle here links unknowable differences in 
phenomenology to unknowable aspects of  phenomenology. 
The most straightforward way for this principle to be true would be if  the 
phenomenological differences between experiences in Q-pairs were an 
aspect of  the phenomenology of  those experiences. But is this right? As 
we have just set out the nature of  the differences in phenomenology, it 
doesn’t make sense to suppose that the difference between E1 and E2 is 
an aspect of  phenomenology. The difference in phenomenology is a 
relation that the two experiences stand in to one another, not an aspect of  
either individual experience. Differences between the phenomenology of  
two experiences should not themselves be thought of  as aspects of  
phenomenology. (LP) is unsupported. 
Perhaps part of  the confusion here rests on a failure to adequately 
recognise the diachronic nature of  the difference in question. For it might 
be plausible to think that phenomenological differences between synchronic 
parts of  experiences must themselves be aspects of  the phenomenology 
(perhaps when restricted to particular perceptual modalities). The left part 
of  your visual field is redder than the right part of  your visual field. This is 
a difference in phenomenology which obtains between parts of  your 
 
experience with the phenomenal nature PN1 requires that she be in a position to know 
that she is not having an experience with the phenomenal nature PN2; but that’s just to 
say that she must be in a position to know that these experiences are distinct. Accepting 
premise 1 doesn’t require one to deny this claim. Rather, it requires only that Jaya is not 
in a position to rule out the relevant alternatives on the basis of introspection. We take it that 
this is independently plausible – so if one wants to hold on to the relevant alternatives 
condition as a condition on knowledge, then one should take it that Jaya’s capacity to rule 
out the relevant alternatives is not based in introspection. 
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visual experience. But this difference is also itself  an aspect of  your 
phenomenology. The diachronic case is not like this: differences between 
the phenomenology of  diachronic experiences need not themselves be 
aspects of  the phenomenology. 
Here is another way to put the point: the naïve realist can allow that there 
is a difference between how things seem to Jaya when she experiences a1, and 
how things seem to Jaya when she experiences a2. But it doesn’t follow that it 
seems to Jaya as if  there is a difference between her experience of  a1 and 
her experience of  a2. A difference in seemings is not a seeming difference. 
To summarise: (LP) holds that if  there can be phenomenological 
differences between experiences in Q-pairs which are in principle 
undetectable by means of  introspection, then there can be aspects of  the 
phenomenology of  the experiences in Q-pairs which are introspectively 
unknowable. But the naïve realist particularist is not compelled to accept 
this claim. It is compatible with Jaya knowing all the aspects of  her 
phenomenology of  the experiences in Q-pairs that she not be able to 
know, through introspection, some fact about the relation between the 
experiences. 
Is there anything that the proponent of  (LP) can say in response? We have 
assumed above that the phenomenological difference between experiences 
in Q-pairs is a relation between the experiences in Q-pairs – and given that 
assumption, we have shown that such differences can be both 
introspectively unknowable and not aspects of  phenomenology. But the 
proponent of  (LP) might try to advance their case by employing an 
alternative understanding of  phenomenological differences. Consider a 
nice example from Fred Dretske’s discussion of  change blindness (2004, 
pp.9-10). Your friend lacks a moustache. He later grows one. A difference 
between your friend at the earlier time and your friend at the later time is 
the moustache. One can perceive this, and thus perceive a difference, even 
without identifying it as such (one might not notice that one’s friend 
differs in now having a moustache even if  one sees the moustache, which 
is the difference).13 The moustache makes for a difference between your friend 
at t1 and your friend at t2. You get to perceive the difference by perceiving 
 
13 Dretske calls this the object model of differences, in comparison to the fact model (2004, p. 
9). Our previous discussion could be recast in terms of the fact model. 
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this difference maker. Call this the difference maker model of  difference. On 
this account, perception of  differences is perception of  difference makers. 
So now let’s switch back to Q-pairs, in particular to E1 and E2, and to 
introspection. One difference maker between E1 and E2 is an aspect of  
the phenomenology of  E2: namely that it has a particular phenomenal 
nature, it being a presentation of  that apple a2. If  phenomenological 
differences are the phenomenological difference makers, then the 
phenomenological difference between E1 and E2 – the phenomenal 
nature of  E2 – is an aspect of  phenomenology. (LP) is true. 
The problem here is that if  one understands phenomenological 
differences on the difference maker model, then although (LP) comes out 
as true, it becomes false that the relevant differences are introspectively 
unknowable. After all, if  a phenomenological difference between E1 and 
E2 just is the phenomenal nature of  E2, then there is no reason for a 
naïve realist particularist to deny that that aspect of  the phenomenology of  
E2 is introspectively knowable. Jaya can know, when undergoing E2, that 
her experience is an experience of  that apple. That is, this aspect of  
phenomenology, PN2, comes within the scope of  her introspective 
knowledge. (LP) comes out as true, but the first premise of  the Self-
Knowledge Argument comes out as false.14 Either way, the argument fails. 
To sum up, the naïve realist particularist can reject (2) of  the Self-
Knowledge Argument on an understanding of  it on which the 
phenomenological differences between experiences in Q-pairs are 
relations between those experiences. Those relations may be 
introspectively unknowable, but as we’ve explained, for all that, the 
relevant aspects of  phenomenology can still be introspectively knowable. 
And if  we understand phenomenological differences between experiences 
in Q-pairs as difference makers, namely aspects of  phenomenology, then a 
version of  (2) is true, but – for the same reason – (1) will be false. Thus 
the naïve realist particularist can reject the Self-Knowledge Argument. 
 
14 This mirrors Dretske’s remarks on the object model. If we do understand differences 
and cognition of them in these terms – and note, that Dretske doesn’t endorse this model 
–  then differences, as difference makers, can be seen, even if they can’t be identified as 
such. So just as one might see a difference maker in seeing one’s friend’s moustache, even 
if one fails to know that they have changed, one might introspect a difference maker between 
experiences, in introspecting aspects of phenomenology, even if one fails to know that 
the experiences differ in phenomenology. 
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7. Conclusion: Introspective and Visual Indiscriminability 
We’ve argued that the naïve realist particularist can reject the Self-
Knowledge Argument. And aside from the considerations to do with self-
knowledge that we’ve scrutinized here, it is not obvious why we should 
accept (PDP), that phenomenological differences between Q-pair 
experiences must be introspectively detectable. 
But have we said enough to defend naïve realist particularism? Normally 
phenomenological differences between experiences are introspectible. Jaya 
sees a tomato for what it is, and then later she sees a kangaroo for what it 
is. These experiences differ phenomenologically, and that is something 
that is introspectively accessible to Jaya. And the same holds for countless 
other pairs. And one might think that even if  this doesn’t establish (PDP) 
tout court, still it suggests that any deviation from the principle requires an 
explanation. And that places an explanatory burden on the naïve realist 
particularist: what is it which determines that the phenomenological 
differences between Q-Pairs are introspectively undetectable when 
phenomenological differences between experiences are normally 
introspectively detectable? One way to frame the challenge here is as 
follows. Sometimes the relations of  diachronic phenomenological 
difference are introspectively accessible – even if  they are never aspects of  
phenomenology. So why is it that we can’t be introspectively given the 
non-identities which constitute the diachronic phenomenological 
differences in Q-pairs? 
Our answer falls neatly out of  our account of  the particularity and 
generality of  experience and showcases the central idea of  a naïve realist 
account of  perception.15 The phenomenological differences between Q-
pairs are not introspectible because the objects of  the respective visual 
experiences are themselves qualitatively identical. Qualitatively identical 
objects are visually indiscriminable, and when two objects are visually 
indiscriminable we should expect that the visual experiences which involve 
those objects as constituents will themselves be introspectively 
indiscriminable. That is, the naïve realist account of  visual experience 
predicts that experiences of  objects which are visually indiscriminable will 
themselves be introspectively indiscriminable. The impossibility of  
detecting the phenomenological differences between Q-pairs is explained 
 
15 See (Brewer 2011, pp.98-99) for a similar line of thought. 
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by the naïve realist account of  the relation between mind-independent 
objects and visual experiences and the resulting implications for the 
relations between visual and introspective discriminability.  
Consider our example. Jaya’s kangaroo experience has a phenomenal 
nature KN, and her tomato experience has a phenomenal nature TN. 
Introspective reflection can reveal these to be distinct precisely because 
they differ qualitatively – and the explanation of  this is the fact that the 
relevant particulars are qualitatively non-identical. But this isn’t true for Q-
pairs. PN1 and PN2 are numerically distinct but qualitatively identical 
phenomenal natures –  and the explanation of  this is the fact that the 
relevant particulars are qualitatively identical. It looks, then, like we have the 
following pattern of  explanation. One cannot introspectively tell apart 
PN1 and PN2 because the particulars these natures involve are 
qualitatively the same.16 But one can introspectively tell apart KN and T1 
because the particulars these natures involve are qualitatively different.  
And this mirrors the situation for perceptual knowledge. One cannot 
perceptually tell apart this apple and that apple because they are 
qualitatively identical, but one can perceptually tell apart this kangaroo 
from that tomato, because they are qualitatively non-identical. It is the 
visual indiscriminability of  the objects involved in Q-pairs which explains 
the introspective indiscriminability of  the experiences in Q-pairs. We have a 
principled explanation as to why (PDP) fails in cases of  Q-pairs, one 
which turns on a naïve realist account of  the relation between objects and 
experiences. 
Once we see the connection between visual discrimination and 
introspective discrimination, the nature and bounds of  our introspective 
knowledge of  visual experiences becomes clearer. We have argued above 
that introspection is constrained when it comes to knowing certain 
phenomenological differences, but that this is compatible with introspection 
allowing knowledge of  phenomenal natures. Similarly, the fact that Jaya 
cannot tell this apple apart from that apple on the basis of  perception 
shows that there is a limit to her perceptual knowledge. But it doesn’t 
follow from this that Jaya cannot have perceptual knowledge of  the very 
particulars in question. She can perceptually know, for instance, that this 
exists, and that that exists, even if  she cannot tell this and that apart. Limits 
 
16 Holding fixed any other aspects of the phenomenal natures. See fn. 8 above. 
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to introspective knowledge concerning the differences between things no 
more imply limits to introspective knowledge of  things which are different 
than limits to perceptual knowledge concerning the differences between 
things imply limits to perceptual knowledge of  things which are different.  
We have argued in this essay that the naïve realist can provide a compelling 
account of  both the particularity and the generality of  experience. And we 
have argued that in doing so, the naïve realist is not committed to denying 
any principle about the impossibility of  aspects of  phenomenology which 
are in principle inaccessible. Moreover, the limits to introspection to which 
the naïve realist is committed are limits which are explained by the limits 
to perception which arise when we perceive qualitatively identical but 
numerically indistinct things. The naïve realist account of  visual 
experience predicts a limit to introspection without being committed to 
there being aspects of  phenomenology which are everywhere and always 
beyond our ken. 
This matters because many of  those involved in these debates – both 
opponents and defenders of  naïve realism – sometimes assume that naïve 
realism implies some kind of  restriction on the kind of  knowledge 
subjects can have of  the phenomenology of  their own experiences. This 
seems to us too hasty a conclusion. There is something which perceivers 
cannot come to know about their experiences on the basis of  
introspection – namely, something about the relations between their 
experiences and other experiences. But this is compatible with subjects 
knowing all there is to know about the phenomenology of  their 
experiences. Neither the naïve realist’s explanation of  the particularity of  
experience nor the naïve realist’s explanation of  the generality of  
experience pose a threat to the kind of  self-knowledge we can have of  the 
phenomenology of  our own perceptual experiences. 
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